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1 
GENDER AND SECURITIES LAW IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 




The 2010 appointment of Elena Kagan to the United States Supreme 
Court meant that, for the first time, three female justices would serve 
together on that court.1  The appointment, among both supporters and 
detractors, was recognized as historic.2  Less clear, then and now, is 
whether   Justice  Kagan’s   gender  will   really  matter   in   how   she   votes   as   a  
justice.  This question is an especially visible aspect of a larger issue: do 
female judges display gendered voting patterns in the cases that come 
before them?3 
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 1 David Jackson, Senate Confirms Elena Kagan to Supreme Court, USA TODAY (Aug. 5, 2010, 
6:59 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2010/08/supreme-court-justice-elena-
kagan-confirmed-by-senate/1. 
 2 See, e.g., Robert Barnes, High-court Divide Has a New Dynamic, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/02/AR2010100203956.html; Press 
Release,  National  Organization  for  Women,  NOW  Applauds  President  Obama’s  Historic  Nomination  to  
Supreme Court (May 10, 2010), available at http://www.now.org/press/05-10/05-10.html. 
 3 See infra Part II. 
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Understandably, with relatively few women judges serving on 
American courts until the latter part of the 20th century, the relationship of 
gender and judicial voting patterns has received serious scholarly attention 
for fewer than twenty years.4  Numerous studies, using diverse 
methodologies, have examined the voting behavior of women judges sitting 
on different courts and ruling on a variety of substantive law issues.  Along 
with these empirical findings, several theories have been advanced as to 
why women judges might—and might not—be expected to vote differently 
than their male colleagues on particular legal subjects.5 
This article makes a novel contribution to the growing literature on 
female voting patterns.  We investigated whether female justices on the 
United States Supreme Court voted differently than, or otherwise 
influenced, male justices on securities law issues decided by that court over 
the four decades spanning the years 1971-2010.  To our knowledge, no 
prior empirical study has examined gender and judging in the securities 
area on any court, and only one study has assessed that topic in the related 
field of corporate law.6 
Our study’s   findings   revealed   no   discernible   gender   impact   on   the  
outcome of securities cases in the Supreme Court.  Neither female Justices 
on an individual basis, nor panels including female Justices, showed any 
significant difference in the resolution of securities law issues.  In this 
respect, our findings are consistent with the majority of judicial voting 
studies showing that gender primarily impacts judicial decision-making in 
cases involving feminist issues, particularly sex discrimination.7  They also 
tend to support, indirectly, the position that females in the corporate 
boardroom may not change decision outcomes.8 
Nevertheless, our data do suggest several interesting and meaningful 
trends in securities cases involving female Justices.  For example, a 
comparison between all-male panels and female-included panels showed 
that a female-included panel was marginally more likely to leave open the 
possibility of sanctions for securities violations, as opposed to declining to 
impose sanctions altogether, which an all-male panel most often held.9  
All-male panels also were more likely than female-included panels to 
demonstrate a pro-corporate bias, measured by whether the Court held for 
the corporate party and whether that corporate party was the defendant in 
the lower court action.10 
 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See Christina Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on 
Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 390, 397 (2010), available at 
http://epstein.usc.edu/research/genderjudging.pdf. 
 7 See infra Part II.B. 
 8 Id. 
 9 See infra Part IV. 
 10 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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A further breakdown of the female-included panels suggests that 
although the Court ruled in favor of corporations and found for the 
petitioner   a  majority  of   the   time  under  panels  with  Justice  O’Connor   and  
Justice Ginsburg, as well as Ginsburg-only panels,11 such an outcome was 
less prevalent than with all-male panels.  However, only a small percentage 
of cases yielded these pro-corporate   results  when  O’Connor  was   the  only  
female Justice.  In addition, our data revealed that unanimous verdicts were 
reached more often with female-included panels.12  Accordingly, our data 
tend to suggest that female Justices may induce collaboration among the 
Justices   and  produce  a  panel   effect  on   the  Court’s  deliberation  process—
findings similar to those in the corporate boardroom context where some 
commentators suggest that female board members add this intangible value 
to the decision-making process.13 
Part II of this article provides background and context for our study by 
briefly summarizing the current state of the scholarly literature on female 
judges’  voting  patterns.     Part   III   describes   the  methodology  of  our   study.    
Part IV reports our findings in detail, offers analysis of certain striking 
findings on female justice involvement in the securities law area, and 
suggests directions for future study. 
In addition, by collecting and assessing case data reaching back almost 
forty years, our study establishes a baseline for determining whether the 
unprecedented presence of a third female Justice, Elena Kagan, will itself 
influence voting patterns on our highest court in different ways in the years 
ahead.      This   is   especially   important   given   the   Supreme   Court’s   recent  
renewed interest in securities cases,14 and the likelihood it will decide 
many more such cases in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act, also a historic 
legal development of 2010.15 
 
 11 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 12 See infra Part IV. 
 13 See infra Part II.B. 
 14 In the term that just ended in June 2011, the Supreme Court issued three decisions on securities 
law issues and a fourth decision, which, although centered more generally on class action lawsuits, 
holds important implications for securities litigation. The three securities decisions are Janus Capital 
Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011), Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 
131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011), and Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). The 
class action ruling, while dealing with an employment dispute, addressed the requirements for member 
inclusion in a class more generally and will dramatically affect, not only current mortgage securities 
litigation, but also other securities class actions. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes 131 S. Ct. 2541, 
2550-52 (U.S. 2011). In addition, for the current October 2011 term, the Supreme Court has agreed to 
hear another important case. See Credit Suisse Securities v. Simmonds, 638 F. 3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2010), 
cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011). 
 15 The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
203,  124  Stat.  1376  (2010).  The  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  (“SEC”)  has  been  involved  in  at  
least one significant case concerning the exercise of its new authority under the Dodd-Frank Act. See 
Business Roundtable v. Securities  and  Exch.  Comm’n,  647  F.3d  1144  (D.C.  Cir.  2011).  Although  the  
SEC has indicated that it will not seek a rehearing or appeal the Business Roundtable decision, other 
litigation is likely to arise as the rules implementing the Dodd-Frank Act take effect and the SEC 
continues to test its new authority under the Act. See Press   Release,  U.S.   Sec.   and  Exch.   Comm’n,  
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Prior scholarship exploring the impact of gender on judicial voting has 
focused on two main questions: whether female judges vote differently 
than   male   judges   on   particular   legal   issues   −   typically   referred   to   as  
“individual  effects”  — and whether the presence of a female judge affects 
her   colleagues’   voting   behavior   — commonly   referred   to   as   a   “panel  
effect.”16  Both in theoretical and empirical terms, the field has been highly 
fractured, with different studies in the same area reaching mixed findings.17  
We first describe existing theories and then turn to the actual findings of 
various studies. 
Theories in the gender and judging field can be divided into four 
schools of thought.  The first school became known as the different voice 
theory,  named  after  Carol  Gilligan’s  work,  In a Different Voice.18  Gilligan 
and her followers believe that men and women develop different 
worldviews due to their different experiences, and therefore, that they 
relate to and perceive society in different ways.19  As applied to judicial 
voting patterns, the different voice theory predicts differences in behavior 
between a female judge and her male counterpart over a broad range of 
issues.20  However, the theory does not expect much cross-influence 
between male and female worldviews and therefore, would not expect the 
presence of a female judge to produce a panel effect on her male 
colleagues.21 
The second theory, called representational theory, is influenced by 
Hanna   Pitkin’s   work,   The Concept of Representation.22  The 
representational account holds that female judges represent other females 
before   the   law,   and   that   they  will   rule   to   protect   the   gender’s   interest in 
 
Statement by SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro on Proxy Access Litigation (Sept. 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-179.htm; see also, Matthew Ingber, Litigation: Dodd-Frank: 
One Year Later, INSIDE COUNSEL (July 28, 2011), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2011/07/28/litigation-
dodd-frank-one-year-later  (discussing, among other topics, potential litigation in connection with the 
SEC’s  broader  authority  concerning  aiding  and  abetting  claims). 
 16 See Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 389. 
 17 See, e.g., Susan W. Johnson & Donald R. Songer, Judge Gender and the Voting Behavior of 
Justices on Two North American Supreme Courts, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 265, 266 (2009); Madhavi McCall, 
Structuring  Gender’s   Impact:  Judicial  Voting  Across  Criminal  Justice  Cases, 36 AM. POL. RES. 264, 
265-66 (2008). See also Paula A. Monopoli, Gender and Justice: Parity and the United States Supreme 
Court, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 43, 51 n.36 (2007) (listing representative studies). 
 18 CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). 
 19 See Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 390. 
 20 See id. 
 21 See id. 
 22 See generally HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (University of California Press 
1967). 
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litigation.23  The theory is narrower than the different voice theory, and 
places  its  main  emphasis  on  women’s   issues  such  as  abortion,  affirmative  
action, sex discrimination in employment, and sexual harassment.24  
Representational theory expects individual effects only on the issues that 
“‘are  likely  to  have  a  more  immediate  and  direct  impact  upon  significantly  
larger   numbers   of  women   than  men.’”25  As with different voice theory, 
representational theory does not anticipate any panel effects on male 
judges.26 
The third theory, known as informational theory, focuses on the unique 
experiences and valuable information on which female judges can draw to 
decide cases and influence male colleagues.27  Informational theory 
predicts individual effects only where particular female judges have 
expertise or knowledge beyond their understanding of the law.28  
Informational theory also predicts panel effects in cases that exhibit 
individual effects because male judges are expected to find their female 
colleagues possessing credible and persuasive information gained from 
their gender specific experiences in certain areas.29 
The fourth theory, commonly called the organizational account, 
emphasizes the commonalities among all judges: similar experiences in law 
school, similar work experiences, identical confirmation procedures, and 
identical constraints through the practice of following precedent.30  
Organizational theory predicts that these common professional experiences 
will overcome any gender-based differences.31  The theory therefore posits 
that there will be no individual or panel effects in any area of the law, when 
viewed along gender lines.32 
 
 23 See Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 390–91. 
 24 See id. 
 25 Susan J. Carroll, Women Candidates and Support for Feminist Concerns: The Closet Feminist 
Syndrome, 37 W. POL. Q. 307, 308 (1984). 
 26 See id. Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 390–91. 
 27 See Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 391–92. 
 28 See id. 
 29 See, e.g., id. at 392. 
 30 See id. 
 31 See id. (citing Darrell Steffensmeier & Chris Herbert, Women and Men Policymakers: Does the 
Judge’s  Gender  Affect  the  Sentencing  of  Criminal  Defendant?, 77 SOC. FORCES 1163, 1165 (1999)). 
 32 Social psychological theories can also be used to explain gender differences. Self-referencing 
posits that, when a person makes a decision about how others perceive a situation, they first consider 
how they would respond. Self-referencing research has found that women, as compared to men, are 
more likely to find that Title VII sexual discrimination has occurred, partially because they are more 
likely to have experienced sexual harassment. See generally Richard L. Wiener & Linda E. Hurt, How 
Do People Evaluate Social Sexual Conduct at Work? A Psycholegal Model, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
75, 75-85 (2000); Maria Rotundo, Dung-Hanh Nguyen & Paul R. Sackett, A Meta-Analytic Review of 
Gender Differences in Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 914, 914-22 (2001). 
Self-referencing research could explain prior research on how female Justices differ in their Title VII 
decisions. A Social Identity Theory model postulates that people do not use themselves as the anchor 
for analysis but, rather, protect members of their in-groups and discriminate against out-groups. See 
generally Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior in 
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B. Findings 
 
Scholars have explored a wide variety of case law in searching for and 
measuring gender effects.  Studies typically seek to control for ideology or 
political party, and will often control for several other factors, which may 
include the makeup of the court the judge sits on, region, the age of the 
judge, the year of decision, the ideological makeup of the Supreme Court, 
or the direction of the lower court decision.33 
In criminal law studies, to illustrate, the findings of the effect of gender 
on judicial voting have been mixed.  McCall examined cases with strong 
and moderate gender interest,34 and found individual effects and panel 
effects in both areas.35  However, McCall also found significant gender 
effects in search and seizure cases, where there is no identifiable gender 
factor, suggesting the gender effect in criminal law goes beyond only those 
cases directly affecting women.36  Davis also found that female judges 
were approximately 7% more likely than male judges to vote liberally in 
search and seizure cases.37  Songer, however, found no gender difference in 
search and seizure cases.38 
Songer and Crews-Meyer examined gender in the context of capital 
punishment cases and found both individual and panel effects, although 
surprisingly, only male judges—not female—showed signs of the panel 
effect.39  This suggests that female judges have little or no effect on each 
other in this area.  However, more recently, Boyd, Epstein and Martin 
examined capital penalty cases in their thirteen-part study and found 
neither individual nor panel effects.40 
 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 7, 7–24 (Stephen Worchel & William G. Austin eds., 1986). 
While Social Identity Theory has not been found to predict how men and women perceive alleged acts 
of sexual harassment, in-group/out-group perceptions play a role in how men and women perceive 
alleged acts of religious discrimination in workplace settings. See Jason A. Cantone & Richard L. 
Wiener, Religion at Work: Evaluating Religiously Hostile Work Environment, presented at 2011 Annual 
American Psychological Association Conference in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 2011) (on file with 
authors). 
 33 See Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 397; McCall, supra note 17, at 269-81; Donald R. Songer & 
Kelley A. Crews-Meyer, Does Judge Gender Matter? Decisionmaking in State Supreme Courts, 81 
SOC. SCI. Q. 750, 754-56 (2000). 
 34 See McCall, supra note 17, at 272. McCall categorized the area of domestic abuse as one of 
strong gender interest and the subject of juveniles being tried as adults as one of moderate gender 
interest. 
 35 Id. at 286-87. 
 36 See id. at 285. 
 37 Sue Davis, Susan Haire, & Donald R. Songer, Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129, 132 (1993) [hereinafter Voting Behavior]. 
 38 Id. at 98 (citing Donald Songer, Sue Davis, & Susan Haire, A Reappraisal of Diversification in 
the Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals, 56 J. POL. 425, 433-34 (1994)). 
 39 See Songer & Crews-Meyer, supra note 33, at 757 (2000) (finding a 14% increase in likelihood 
of a liberal vote in death penalty cases if the judge was female). 
 40 Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 406 (concluding that the presence of women in the judiciary rarely 
has an appreciable empirical effect). 
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Songer and Crews-Meyer also examined gender effects in obscenity 
cases and found that a female judge was 15% more likely than her male 
counterpart to be less restrictive of allegedly obscene materials.41  
However,   Davis’   study   disputes   this   finding   by   reporting   no   significant  
differences in general voting patterns in obscenity cases.42 
Unlike other areas of the law, studies examining Title VII sex 
discrimination cases have consistently reported substantial gender effects.43  
These studies have found that a female judge is between 10% to 37% more 
likely than her male counterpart to vote for the plaintiff in a sex 
discrimination case.44  Panel effects have also consistently been found in 
sex discrimination cases, with one study finding a 12-14% increase in the 
likelihood of the plaintiff winning if one member of the panel was 
female,45 and another finding   that   the   plaintiff’s   chance   of   winning   an  
average  male  judge’s  vote  tripled  in  that  same  situation.46 
Many scholars have attempted to explain why gender effects have 
consistently been found in Title VII sex discrimination cases but have not 
been consistently found in any other area.  Proponents of the different voice 
theory believe that it is gender itself that makes a difference, but are hard 
pressed to explain why the gender effects are not widespread.  
Representational theory proponents believe that sex discrimination is the 
area in which female judges are the most determined to protect their 
gender.  Informational theory would anticipate a unique gender effect in 
sex discrimination cases because many of the women currently on the 
bench went to law school in the 1960s or 1970s, where they likely 
experienced discrimination both in law school culture and while attempting 
to find, or advance in, their jobs.47  For example, Dixon argues that Justices 
O’Connor’s   and   Ginsburg’s   high   level   of   support   for   plaintiffs in sex 
discrimination cases is a product of their own experiences of discrimination 
throughout their careers.48  She suggests that this experience makes the 
justices and other female judges of the same generation more sensitive and 
 
 41 Songer & Crews-Meyer, supra note 33, at 757. 
 42 See Kenney, supra note 37, at 97 (citing Voting Behavior, supra note 37 at 131-33). 
 43 See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, Female Justices, Feminism, and the Politics of Judicial Appointment: 
A Re-Examination, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 297, 312 (2009). 
 44 Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 401; Kenney, supra note 37, at 98 (citing Donald R. Songer et al., 
supra note 38, at 425-29). See also Dixon, supra note 43, at 312 (citing Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, 
Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE 
L.J. 1759, 1776 (2005) (finding increase of 65% in likelihood of vote for plaintiff in sex discrimination 
cases)); Kenney, supra note 37, at 97 (citing Voting Behavior, supra note 37, at 131 (finding a 
difference of 17%)); Kenney, supra note 37, at 96 (citing Jon Gottschall, Carter’s   Judicial  
Appointments, 67 JUDICATURE 164, 165-73 (1983) (finding   “some”   differences   between   male   and  
female  judges’  votes  in  sex  discrimination cases)). 
 45 Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 406. 
 46 See Peresie, supra note 44, at 1778. 
 47 Dixon, supra note 43, at 306-07  (discussing  the  discrimination  experienced  by  Justices  O’Connor  
and Ginsburg). 
 48 Id. 
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sympathetic to female plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases and therefore 
also better able to influence their male peers.49  For Dixon, however, the 
effect is likely time-limited because future female judges will be less likely 
to have experienced sex discrimination in law school and in the work 
place.50 
Scholars  also  have  examined  a  possible  link  between  a  judge’s  gender  
and affiliated political party such that ideology, not gender, may lie behind 
voting patterns.  Some studies have found that female judges vote for 
liberal outcomes more frequently than their male counterparts in at least 
some areas.51  Since these liberal votes occurred in the civil liberties area 
and mainly in sex discrimination cases, it may well be a residual effect of 
the gender difference.52  Other studies have suggested that it is a by-
product of the different impact of gender in each political party.  Songer 
and Crews-Meyer found in death penalty and obscenity cases, female 
judges appointed by Democratic presidents are more liberal than male 
judges appointed by the same presidents, but that female judges appointed 
by Republican presidents are neither more liberal nor more conservative 
than male judges also appointed by Republican presidents.53  Davis had a 
similar finding in her study of sex discrimination and search and seizure 
cases.54  Songer and Crews-Meyer speculated that this difference might 
occur because Democratic presidents perceive a larger political advantage 
in appointing liberal female candidates as opposed to women of moderate 
political views, while Republican presidents favor women who can argue 
“that  they  are  ‘no  different’  [politically]  from  their  male  competitors.”55 
In addition, several studies have specifically analyzed the appointment 
and voting records of U.S. Supreme Court female Justices, both as 
individuals and as to their influence on their male colleagues.  After her 
appointment as the first woman on the Supreme Court, for example, Justice 
O’Connor   voted   for   the   plaintiff   in   approximately   89%   of   Title   VII   sex  
discrimination cases.56  After joining the Court in 1993, Justice Ginsburg 
voted for the plaintiff in 92% of Title VII sex discrimination cases.57  
Those voting records are consistent with overall female voting patterns in 
Title  VII  cases.    Strikingly,  however,  O’Connor  and  Ginsburg’s  agreement  
in sex discrimination cases did not translate to other areas.  In civil 
liberties,  criminal,  and  torts  cases,  Justice  O’Connor  was  more  conservative  
 
 49 See id. See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 50 See Dixon, supra note 43, at 308. 
 51 See Songer & Crews-Meyer, supra note 33, at 760 (finding that female judges tend to vote more 
liberally than male judges in civil liberties cases); see also Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 395 (finding that 
female Court of Appeals judges who voted in Title VII sex discrimination lean noticeably to the left). 
 52 See Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 401. 
 53 See Songer & Crews-Meyer, supra note 33, at 758. 
 54 See Kenney, supra note 37, at 97 (citing Voting Behavior, supra note 37, at 129-33). 
 55 See Songer & Crews-Meyer, supra note 33, at 760. 
 56 See Dixon, supra note 43, at 301. 
 57 Id. 
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than Justice Ginsburg and the average male justice, while she was slightly 
more liberal than her male colleagues in equality cases.58  On the other 
hand, Justice Ginsburg was more liberal than the average male in all four 
categories.59  While  Justices  O’Connor  and  Ginsburg  agree  in  their  support  
of plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases, they consistently agree on little 
else. 
Justice  O’Connor   also  made   a   difference   in   the   voting   records   of   her  
male peers.  After her appointment to the Supreme Court, support for 
female plaintiffs in sex discrimination cases rose from 63% to 74%, thus 
providing evidence   of   a   panel   effect   by   Justice   O’Connor   on   her   male  
peers.60  However, the addition of Justice Ginsburg — a   noted  women’s  
rights advocate before her appointment — did not significantly change the 
Court’s   support   for   women’s   rights.61  Davis found that some Justices 
increased  their  support,  but  other  Justices’  support  dropped  dramatically.62  
These studies suggest that appointment of the first woman to a panel is 
likely   to   raise   support   for   women’s   rights   among   male   colleagues,  
especially in sex discrimination cases, but additional women judges or 
justices may meet a more mixed reaction.63  Of course, if the initial female 
judge or justice did substantially influence her male colleagues, there might 
be little room for further change to male voting patterns by the addition of a 
second woman.64  Conversely,  where   the  first  woman’s   influence  is  more  
modest, the addition of a second (or third) judge or justice may result in 
greater changes.  This is an important issue, both in the securities area and 
more generally, with   Justice  Kagan   as   the   Supreme  Court’s   third   female  
Justice. 
In short, studies have found clear signs of gender effects in Title VII 
sex discrimination cases but have found decidedly gender-neutral or mixed 
outcomes in all other areas.65  This has held true for the Supreme Court, 
lower federal courts, and state courts.66 
Little theoretical or empirical attention, however, has been given to 
possible gender voting differences in the business and commercial law 
 
 58 Johnson & Songer, supra note 17, at 270. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Barbara Palmer, Justice  Ruth  Bader  Ginsburg  and   the  Supreme  Court’s  Reaction  to   Its  Second  
Female Member, 24 WOMEN & POL. 1,   7   (2002)   (citing   Karen   O’Connor   &   Jeffrey   Segal,   Justice 
Sandra  Day  O’Connor  and  the  Supreme  Court’s  Reaction  to  Its  First Female Member, 10 WOMEN & 
POL. 95, 97 (1990)). 
 61 See id. at  11  (finding  only  a  0.9%  increase  in  support  for  women’s  rights  claims). 
 62 See Dixon, supra note 43, at 315-16. In particular, after Justice Ginsburg was appointed, the 
Justices  appointed  before  O’Connor  (Blackmun,  Stevens,  and  Rehnquist)  and  some  Justices  appointed  
after   O’Connor   (Kennedy   and   Souter)   increased   their   support,   while   other   Justices   appointed   after  
O’Connor  (Thomas  and  Scalia)  reduced their support dramatically. Palmer, supra note 60, at 11-14. 
 63 See Palmer, supra note 60, at 11-14. 
 64 See id. at 12-14. 
 65 See Peresie, supra note 44, at 1763 (describing prior studies of state supreme courts and federal 
appellate courts). See also Dixon, supra note 43, at 301. 
 66 See Peresie, supra note 44, at 1762-65. See also Dixon, supra note 43, at 301. 
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area.  Boyd and her co-authors reported in a 2010 study of federal judges 
that they found no gender differences in corporate veil piercing cases.67  No 
study appears to have examined gender voting patterns in federal securities 
cases in the federal court system. 
This article seeks to fill that void, providing data and analyses 
concerning Supreme Court voting patterns in securities cases both before 
and   after   Justice  O’Connor’s   appointment   to   the   Court.      The   article   also  
draws upon the growing body of literature discussing the presence of 
women in corporate boardrooms and the role of women in influencing 
group decision-making.68  Although this literature is still developing and is 
somewhat inconclusive regarding outcome effects,69 several studies 
identify a difference in male and female behaviors in the group decision-
making context.70  We consider aspects of those studies here to provide a 
 
 67 Boyd et al., supra note 6, at 403. 
 68 See generally DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE: HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM (New York University Press 2007); LOIS JOY ET AL., 
CATALYST INC., THE BOTTOM LINE: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION ON 
BOARDS (2007), available at www.catalyst.org/publication/200/the-bottom-line-corporate-performance-
and-womens-representation-on-boards; VICKI W. KRAMER ET AL., CRITICAL MASS ON CORPORATE 
BOARDS: WHY THREE OR MORE WOMEN ENHANCE GOVERNANCE (2006) (This report is available for 
purchase and the Executive Summary can be downloaded for free at 
http://www.wcwonline.org/component/option,com_virtuemart/Itemid,217/keyword,kramer/lang,en/pag
e,shop.browse/vmcchk,1/); Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their 
Impact on Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291 (2009); Jayne W. Barnard, More Women 
on Corporate Boards? Not So Fast, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 703 (2007). 
 69 Compare David Carter et al., The Diversity of Corporate Board Committees and Financial 
Performance (Working Paper, Mar. 24, 2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1106698 (suggesting positive effects), with 
Kathleen A. Farrell & Philip L. Hersch, Additions to Corporate Boards: The Effect of Gender, 11 J. 
CORP. FIN. 85 (2005) (suggesting no effects). See also, Adams & Ferreira, supra note 68, at 301 
(concluding   that   the   fraction   of  women   on   corporate   boards   significantly   impacts   “the   sensitivity   of  
CEO  turnover  to  stock  return  performance”);;  Frank  Dobbin  &  Jiwook  Jung,  Corporate Board Gender 
Diversity and Stock Performance: The Competence Gap or Institutional Investor Bias?, 89 N.C. L. 
REV. 809, 822, 837 (2011) (finding that gender bias of institutional investors impacts firm performance 
and, thus, women on corporate boards may negatively influence stock performance). 
 70 See, e.g., Linda L. Carli, Gender and Group Behavior, in HANDBOOK OF GENDER RESEARCH IN 
PSYCHOLOGY 337 (Joan C. Chrisler & Donald R. McReary eds., 2010) (reviewing literature and noting 
that  “[r]esearch  indicates  that  women  exhibit  greater  amounts  of  communal  behavior  than  men  do,  and 
men exhibit greater amounts of agentic behavior than women do . . . . [and] women display more 
warmth,  collaboration,  and  support.”);;  Rebecca  J.  Hannagan  &  Christopher  W.  Larimer,  Does Gender 
Composition Affect Group Decision Outcomes? Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment, 32 POL. 
BEHAV. 51, 60 (2010) (reviewing literature about the gendered decision making processes and finding 
in   laboratory   comparison   that,   compared   to   all   male   groups,   “female   and   mixed   groups   produc[ed]  
outcomes closer to the universal  mean.”);;  Rebecca  J.  Hannagan  &  Christopher  W.  Larimer,  Assessing 
Gender Dynamics in Local Government: Results from a Statewide Field Experiment (Feb. 15, 
2011)(paper prepared for presentation New Research on Gender in Political Psychology Conference at 
Rutgers University, Mar. 4-5, 2011), available at 
http://empowerfitnessevents.com/files/newresearch/ckfinder/files/Larimer%20and%20Hannagan%20-
%20Assessing%20Gender%20Dynamics%20in%20Local%20Government%202-15-11.doc (study 
finding   that  “the  presence  of   females tends to dampen down [sic] the variance and bring preferences 
closer   to   the  mean.”).  See also Drude Dahlerup, The Story of the Theory of Critical Mass, 2 POL. & 
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more  complete  picture  of  the  Court’s  decisions  in  securities  cases.    Taken  
together, these various projects provide us with a better understanding of 
female influence in an array of institutional settings. 
II. STUDY METHODOLOGY 
 
The  study’s  primary  objective  is  to  analyze  voting  patterns  in  Supreme  
Court cases addressing issues raised under federal securities laws to discern 
any effects related to the presence of one or two female Justices on the 
bench.  As described below, we designed the database to achieve this 
particular objective.  The database is not, however, restricted to this 
purpose.  The breadth of the data collected facilitates a broader analysis of 
general trends in securities cases and provides a format that can be 
supplemented as the gender make-up of the Supreme Court continues to 
change over time.  The following discussion explains the components of 
the case database and the general design and scope of the study. 
 
A. The Case Database 
 
The case database consists of eighty-eight federal securities cases 
decided by the Supreme Court between October 1971 and June 2010.  This 
period captures all securities cases decided by the Supreme Court from ten 
years before Justice O’Connor’s  first  term  on  the  Court  in  September  1981,  
through the last complete session before this study in 2010.  During this 
period,   Justice  O’Connor  was   the   only   female   on   the   bench  until  August  
1993, at which time Justice Ginsburg joined the Court.  Justice  O’Connor  
resigned from the Court in January 2006; Justice Ginsburg was then the 
only female Justice until Justice Sotomayor joined the Court in August 
2009.71  Inclusion of the ten-year period of all-male Justice panels prior to 
 
GENDER 511, 519-20 (2006) (arguing that although the exact percentages and measurements of critical 
mass  theory  are  of  minor  importance,  increasing  women’s  political  representation  remains  an  important  
goal); Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Corporate Boardroom: Still a Male Club, 33 J. CORP. L. 665, 679-80 
(2008)  (criticizing  Douglas  M.  Branson’s  argument, supra note 68, that greater board diversity would 
not increase corporate performance and explaining other, non-tangible benefits to including women and 
increasing diversity on corporate boards); Lissa Lamkin Broome et al., Does Critical Mass Matter? 
Views from the Boardroom, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1049,  1079  (2011)  (observing  that  “as  female 
directors, [respondents] feel more at ease and less like tokens or group representatives when there is a 
significant  minority  of  women  on   the  board,”  which   likely enables board members to function more 
effectively) [hereinafter Does Critical Mass Matter?]. 
 71 The database used for this article — with  data  collection  ending  as  of  June  2010  −  captures  only  
the  first  year  of  Justice  Sotomayor’s  service  on  the  Court  and  does  not  include  any  cases  decided  after  
Justice  Kagan’s  appointment  to  the  Court.  We  believe  this facilitates a retrospective analysis of gender 
and securities cases during periods where there was no female Justice or only one or two female 
Justices, while also establishing a baseline for studying whether in 2011 and thereafter the presence of 
three female Justices alters voting patterns. 
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Justice   O’Connor’s   appointment provides a baseline for several of the 
analyses set forth infra Part IV. 
We used two different processes to identify cases that satisfied our 
subject matter and time period restrictions.  First, we searched the Westlaw 
Supreme Court Database for all cases decided by the Court between 
October  1971  and  June  2010  that  were  coded  as  “Securities  Regulation,”  or  
included   the   Securities   Act   of   1933(“Securities   Act”),   the   Securities  
Exchange  Act  of  1934  (“Exchange  Act”),  or  the  Investment  Company  Act  
of 1940 in the case headnotes.  Second, we searched the U.S. Supreme 
Court Database for all cases decided by the Court between October 1971 
and  June  2010  that  were  coded  as  “Securities  Regulation.”    In  this  second  
search, we also reviewed other cases coded as “Economic  Activity”  cases  
to confirm the identification of all securities cases.  We then reconciled the 
two searches, which yielded forty-eight securities cases decided during the 
pre-O’Connor   period   and   forty-three such cases decided subsequent to 
Justice  O’Connor’s  appointment.    The  large  number  of  cases  decided  in  the  
one  decade  prior  to  O’Connor’s  appointment,  in  comparison  to  the  number  
in the almost three decades thereafter, is itself a striking finding, revealing 
an overall dramatic decline in the Court’s  attention  to  securities  cases  after  
the  1970’s.72  We removed three cases after further review because they did 
not involve securities law issues, leaving eighty-eight cases for the 
database.73 
 
 72 Although it is difficult to isolate a single cause for the decline in securities cases decided by the 
Court, it is likely attributable to several factors, including the business and social climate of that time 
period, the leadership at the SEC, and the makeup of the Court. In fact, at least one study suggests that 
“Justices  who   are   ideologically   aligned   on   the  merits   tend   to   vote   together   on   certiorari  much  more  
consistently than those Justices who are ideologically opposed on the merits, suggesting that there is a 
significant merits-oriented   component   to   the   Justices’   certiorari   formulas.”   Margaret   Meriwether  
Cordray & Richard Cordray, Strategy in Supreme Court Case Selection: The Relationship Between 
Certiorari and the Merits, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2 (2008). 
 73 Given the small sample size, we opted to code and analyze all eighty-eight cases, rather than limit 
the sample pool through a random selection process. In addition to the case data collected by the coding 
team, we also added information to the database regarding the individual Justices to serve as control 
variables in the various analyses. As described infra Part IV, although we found certain striking gender-
related voting patterns, the presence of a female Justice on the Court did not produce any statistically 
significant effects on overall case outcomes. Accordingly, we did not find a need to invoke personal 
attributes, such as education, socio-economic status, family status, etc., as control variables in 
regression analyses. Nevertheless, as noted infra Part IV, anecdotal evidence suggests that ideology 
may impact the resolution of securities cases before the Supreme Court and may warrant further study. 
Prior studies of judicial decisions in general have suggested an ideological effect. See supra notes 51-55 
and accompanying text. See also Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What is Judicial Ideology, and 
How Should We Measure It? 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 135 (2009) (acknowledging that political 
“ideology plays a significant role in judicial decision-making,”   while   criticizing   the   methods   of  
measuring political ideology); Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We Talk About Ideology: 
Judicial Politics Scholarship and Naïve Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 231, 235-36 (2009) 
(explaining  the  theory  of  “judicial  politics,”  which  supports  the  idea  that  judges  decide  the  outcome  of  a  
case  according  to  their  “ideology.”). 
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The data collected and included in the database provides a wealth of 
information   about   the   Supreme   Court’s   conduct   in   securities   cases   since  
October 1971.  The database also can be expanded upon for future studies 
to include securities cases decided by the Court after June 2010, thereby 
examining   Justice   Kagan’s voting behavior and influence, as well as to 
include a larger cross-section of business law cases that are not specifically 
securities law centric.  This article, however, specifically reports on gender-
related voting in the securities area. 
 
B. The  Study’s Design and Scope 
 
We devoted significant time to creating, testing, and refining the 
project-coding scheme.  The final coding scheme included twenty primary 
variables, with multiple sub-variables, developed specifically to identify 
key factors relevant to the questions underlying our study.74  The variables 
targeted information in the following general categories: basic case 
information, party identities, amici participation, legal issues presented, 
holdings of the Court as to whether sanctions were imposed or at least held 
open  as  a  possibility,  and  the  different  Justices’  votes.    A  basic  description  
of each of the variables and sub-variables is set forth in Appendix A.  We 
tested and refined the coding scheme through multiple practice rounds of 
coding with our coding team.  We ultimately achieved an acceptable inter-
coder reliability rate and proceeded to code the eighty-eight cases.75 
During the actual study, each member of the coding team worked 
independently to code his or her assigned cases.  This process required each 
member to review the particular Supreme Court decision and information 
included in the LEXIS Supreme Court Database regarding amicus briefs 
filed in the case.76  Upon completion of the coding, we reviewed and 
reconciled any inconsistencies in the database, which required only minor, 
non-substantive changes.  We then finalized the database and proceeded 
with our analyses of the data. 
As described below, we performed several sets of analyses with the 
data.  We first considered the data in the context of general trends in 
securities cases.  These analyses focused on variables such as legal issues 
presented,  the  presence  of  amici,  and  the  Court’s  holding.    These  analyses  
 
 74 In addition to sub-variables, the coding scheme also included detailed instructions for coding 
each variable that were developed through the practice coding rounds. These instructions helped coders 
approach each variable in a consistent, objective manner. Some key instructions are included in 
footnotes to Appendix A. 
 75 Across the twenty primary variables and multiple sub-variables, inter-coder reliability between 
the five coders was higher than 90% for all variables, with a high of 100% agreement for multiple 
variables. 
 76 An initial review of the Westlaw and LEXIS databases indicated similar but not always identical 
inventories of Supreme Court amicus briefs. We instructed all coders to use the LEXIS Supreme Court 
Database for the amicus brief variable because one member of the coding team did not have access to 
Westlaw and we wanted to maintain consistency in the data collection process. 
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are only summarized in this article to provide context for the gender 
findings; we anticipate providing a full exploration of these data in a 
separate article or forum. 
We then scrutinized the data and general analyses in light of the 
Supreme  Court’s   gender   composition   at   the   time   of   the   decision.      These  
analyses were designed to focus on the impact of female Justices on the 
Court’s  holdings  in  securities  cases.    We  evaluated  both  individual  Justice  
voting patterns, as well as potential panel effects.  In addition, we 
performed a separate substantive review of certain cases in the database 
that presented striking, but not necessarily statistically significant, results in 
our quantitative analyses.  The results of our various analyses in the gender 
context are set forth in detail below. 
 
III. DATA REPORT AND ANALYSIS 
 
In seeking to identify and analyze any gender impact on securities cases 
decided by the Supreme Court, our basic hypothesis was that the presence 
of one or more female Justices on the Court would not significantly affect 
the outcome of the cases.  We based this hypothesis on the majority of 
judicial voting studies showing gender impact almost exclusively in the 
context of cases involving traditional feminist issues.77  The data tend to 
prove our hypothesis. 
Securities cases typically do not raise gender sensitive or traditionally 
feminist issues.  Female Justices likely have similar experiences to their 
male colleagues with securities law issues; additionally, most cases do not 
involve a particular issue unique to gender that warrants special 
consideration or to which female Justices bring gender-specific expertise or 
knowledge.  Consequently, our findings also garner support under the 
various theories of gender and voting discussed in Part II.A.78 
Perhaps   just   as   important   are   the   study’s   secondary   findings   that  
suggest several intriguing associations and trends in securities cases 
involving female Justices.  For example, all five female-authored majority 
opinions involving alleged violations of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 
remand at least one issue to the lower court, and focus more on serving 
legislative intent than showing a pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant bias.79  
Moreover, all-male panels were marginally more likely to decline to 
impose sanctions than panels including at least one female Justice, which 
were marginally more likely to leave open the possibility for sanctions.80  
 
 77 See supra notes 32-50 and accompanying text. 
 78 See supra Part II.A. 
 79 See infra Part IV.D.1.f. 
 80 See infra Part IV.D.1. 
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The Court also was more likely to decide a case by a unanimous decision 
when at least one female Justice was present on the panel.81 
We believe these data support meaningful inferences that may provide a 
foundation for further study.  Specifically, the presence of a female Justice 
may change the dynamics of deliberations and facilitate collaborative 
decisions.  Although studies debate whether females in the corporate 
boardroom impact firm financial performance, several commentators 
emphasize the cultural and other non-outcome related value to having 
female group members.82  Our study suggests that such intangible value 
may exist, not only in the boardroom, but also in the courtroom.83 
This section first presents basic descriptive and background data that 
identify the attributes of the eighty-eight cases included in the database.  
The data suggest significant findings with respect to the presence of amicus 
briefs in the case.  These findings appear driven primarily by the amicus 
filings themselves, and not by the gender of the Justices.  Nevertheless, we 
provide some of the key data for context and potential further study.  The 
section then delves into the gender-specific data.  It presents both the 
overall findings, as well as discrete analyses performed on specific gender 
data.  The section concludes by synthesizing the gender data and 
suggesting opportunities for future studies. 
 
A. Background Data Analysis 
 
1. Variables of Interest in Database 
 
We first examined the frequencies of the variables of interest to make 
sure we had adequate variation to perform the analyses.  For example, we 
investigated the legal issue before the U.S. Supreme Court.  In order of 
frequency, the legal issues from the eighty-eight case opinions were: the 
 
 81 See infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 82 See supra notes 69-71. See also Diana Bilimoria, Building the Business Case for Women 
Corporate Directors, in WOMEN ON CORPORATE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS: INTERNATIONAL 
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 25, 27 (Ronald J. Burke & Mary C. Mattis eds., 2000) (referencing 
studies that posit female board   members   “generate   a   more   productive   discourse   around   the   board  
table. . . .”);;  Zena  Burgess  &  Phyllis  Tharenou,  Women Board Directors: Characteristics of the Few, 37 
J. BUS. ETHICS 39, 40 (2002) (explaining reasons often offered for including women on boards of 
directors,  including  their  “influence  on  decision  making  and  leadership  styles  of  the  organization”  and  
“ensuring  ‘better’  board-room  behavior”);;  KRAMER ET AL., supra note 68 (study finding that women in 
the   boardroom   “bring   a   collaborative   leadership   style   that   benefits   boardroom   dynamics.”).   But see 
Does Critical Mass Matter? supra note 70, at 1080 (urging skepticism towards studies suggesting 
different   outcomes   based   on   a   critical   mass   theory   because   “[a]lthough   increased   minority  
representation could enhance opportunities for collaboration and support . . . other scenarios are also 
plausible.”). 
 83 See also Linda S. Maule, A Different Voice: The Feminine Jurisprudence of the Minnesota State 
Supreme Court, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 295, 315 (2000-01) (finding in a study of Minnesota Supreme 
Court  that,  “[a]lthough  the  level  of  consensus  for  the  court  as  a  whole  increased  as  more  women  were  
placed  on  the  bench,  the  female  justices  also  began  to  dissent  more  frequently.”). 
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Exchange Act (forty-five, 51.1%); both the Exchange Act and Securities 
Act (eleven, 12.5%); other (eleven, 12.5%); the 1940 Investment Company 
Act (six, 6.8%); the Securities Act (five, 5.7%); the Exchange Act and 
other (four, 4.5%); the Securities Act, Exchange Act, and the 1940 Act 
(two, 2.3%); state securities laws (two, 2.3%); the 1940 Act and other (one, 
1.1%); and a state securities law and other (one, 1.1%). 
We then examined the case holdings.  The Court found for the 
petitioner in fifty-three (60.2%) cases, the respondent in thirty-two 
(36.4%), neither in two (2.3%), and both (in some manner) in one (1.1%) 
of the opinions.  Looking to what the Court held, the Court declined to 
impose sanctions or liability under the securities laws in forty (45.5%) of 
the opinions, left open the possibility of some type of sanction or liability 
in thirty (34.1%) of the opinions, did not discuss sanctions or liability in 
eleven (12.5%) of the opinions, imposed monetary sanctions in four (4.5%) 
of the opinions, and imposed other liability or non-monetary sanctions in 
three  (3.4%)  of  the  opinions.    With  respect  to  the  Court’s  treatment  of  the  
lower   court’s   decision,   the   Court   affirmed   in   thirty   (34.1%);;   reversed   in  
twenty-three (26.1%); reversed and remanded in twenty (22.7%); vacated 
in four (4.5%); vacated and remanded in three (3.4%); affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, and remanded in three (4.5%); and remanded in two 
(2.3%) of the opinions — in one opinion, the Court affirmed in part and 
remanded, and, in another opinion, the Court reversed in part and 
remanded. 
Additionally, we investigated the amicus curiae briefs.  Of the eighty-
eight case opinions, twenty-two (25.0%) did not have an amicus brief filed 
for either party, thirty (34.1%) had an amicus brief for one of the parties, 
and thirty-six (40.9%) had amicus briefs filed for both parties.  Of the thirty 
case opinions with an amicus brief for only one of the parties, the brief was 
filed for the petitioner in twelve of the case opinions and for the respondent 
in eighteen of the case opinions. 
We then further investigated the parties in the case, specifically whether 
the Court ultimately finds more often for the original petitioner or 
respondent.  In a cross tabs analysis of for whom the Court found, and 
which party was the defendant in the lower court action, we found that the 
Court finds for the defendant in fifty-four of the opinions and for the 
plaintiff in thirty-one of the opinions.  This is almost perfectly reversed 
from   the  Court’s   finding   for the petitioner in fifty-three opinions and for 
the respondent in thirty-two of the opinions.  It may indicate an association 
between the party identity of petitioners in the U.S. Supreme Court and 
defendants in the related lower court action.  As discussed infra Part 
IV.B.2, the data suggest that, when the Court holds in favor of a corporate 
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2. The Role of Legal Issue 
 
With the above frequencies in mind, we then investigated whether the 
legal  issue  before  the  Court  affected  the  Court’s  ultimate  holding  (e.g.,  for  
whom the Court found, what the Court found, and how the Court treated 
the  lower  court’s  decision).    Regarding  for  whom  the  Court  found,  the  legal  
issue did not make a significant difference.84  The Court found for the 
petitioner in 60.2% of the cases, and found for the petitioner in 60% of the 
forty-five Exchange Act cases, which comprised more than half of the 
sample, after the three cases were removed where the Court found for both 
or neither party.  One interesting finding is that cases involving both the 
Securities Act and Exchange Act were disproportionately more likely to 
result in a holding for the petitioner (80.0% do, as compared to 60.2% of 
the overall sample, 60.0% for the Exchange Act alone and 60.0% for the 
Securities Act alone).85 
Overall, the legal issue before the Court did not affect whether the 
Court imposed or declined to impose sanctions.86  Cases involving the 
Exchange Act did not differ significantly from the overall case set:87 the 
Court declined to impose sanctions or liability under securities laws in 
46.7% (45.5% overall), left open the possibility of some type of sanction or 
liability in 31.1% (34.1% overall), did not discuss sanctions or liability in 
15.6% (12.5% overall), imposed monetary sanctions in 6.6% (4.5% 
overall), and imposed other liability or non-monetary sanctions in none 
(3.4% overall).  Cases involving both the Securities and Exchange Acts are 
more likely to result in the Court leaving open the possibility of sanctions 
(in 45.5% of cases, as compared to 34.1% overall, 31.1% for the Exchange 
Act alone and 40.0% for the Securities Act alone).  All four of the cases 
where the Court imposed monetary sanctions involved the Exchange Act, 
while all three of the cases resulting in the imposition of other non-
monetary sanctions involved the Securities Act.  The sample size for these 
findings is too small to draw initial conclusions, but each finding warrants 
further research to examine the role of the legal issue on imposition of 
sanctions. 
To further examine the unique role of cases involving both the 
Securities and Exchange Acts, we then explored whether the Court treated 
their lower court decisions differently.  Results found that the Court did; 
cases involving both the Securities and Exchange Acts were those most 
likely to be reversed (in 54.5% of these cases, as compared to 26.4% of the 
overall cases, 25.0% of the Exchange Act cases, and 20.0% of the 
 
 84 X 2 (27) = 11.29, p = .997; the result remains non-significant, X2(27) = 4.21, p = .887, even after 
removing the three cases where the Court found for both or neither party. 
 85 See id. 
 86 X 2 (36) = 43.39, p = .185. 
 87 See id. 
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Securities Act cases).  There were no other significant trends when 
comparing the treatment of lower court decision and the raised legal issue.  
Overall, it appears that when the Court was provided a complex case 
involving both the Securities and Exchange Acts, the Court was more 
likely to find for the petitioner, leaving open the possibility of sanctions 
(but  not  imposing  them),  and/or  reversing  the  lower  court’s  decision. 
 
3. The Role of Amicus Briefs 
 
We then explored whether the presence of amicus briefs affected the 
Court’s  holding.    This  analysis consisted of three parts: the role of amicus 
briefs overall and then the role of petitioner and respondent amicus briefs. 
Overall, when an amicus brief was filed in the case, the Court was 
significantly more likely to find for the respondent.88  In particular, the 
Court found for the respondent in 44.4% (twenty-eight of sixty-three) of 
the cases where an amicus brief for either party was filed, while the Court 
found for the petitioner in 18.2% (four of twenty-two) of the cases when no 
amicus brief was filed for either party.  The presence of an amicus brief 
(for either party)  mitigated  the  Court’s  general  trends  discussed  supra Part 
IV.A.1 to find in favor of petitioners.  This effect, however, focused on 
only whether any amicus brief was filed, not on which party was supported. 
The Court declined to impose sanctions in 40.9% of cases (twenty-
seven of sixty-six) when an amicus brief was filed for either party and 
declined to impose sanctions in 59.1% of cases (thirteen of twenty-two) 
with no amicus brief.  However, no significant effect emerged when 
examining whether the presence of an amicus brief affected our composite 
variable   concerning   the   Court’s   decision   to   impose   sanctions   and,   if  
relevant, what type of sanctions were imposed.89  The presence of an 
amicus brief likewise had no effect on how the Court treated the lower 
court’s  decision.90  Accordingly, the primary impact of amicus briefs in the 
analysis so far is the finding that the Court was more likely to hold in favor 
of the respondent when an amicus brief is filed. 
From this set of findings, one would assume that the majority of amicus 
briefs in this analysis were filed in support of the respondent.  As expected, 
when there was an amicus brief filed for the respondent (in 46.2% of cases, 
twenty-four of fifty-two), the Court was significantly more likely to find 
for the respondent, as compared to cases where no amicus brief for the 
respondent was filed (in 24.2% of cases, eight of thirty-three).91  While the 
filing of an amicus brief for the respondent generally improved the 
likelihood that the Court would find for the respondent, the Court was still 
 
 88 X 2 (1) = 4.79, p < .05. 
 89 X 2 (4) = 5.24, p = .26. 
 90 X 2 (8) = 6.37, p = .61. 
 91 X 2 (1) = 4.13, p < .05. 
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more likely to find for the petitioner.  In addition, the presence of an 
amicus brief for the respondent did not affect whether sanctions were 
imposed,92 or how  the  Court  treated  the  lower  court’s  opinion.93 
Surprisingly, the presence of an amicus brief for the petitioner did not 
affect for whom the Court held.94  For example, the Court found for the 
petitioner in 65.8% (twenty-five of thirty-eight) of the cases without a 
petitioner amicus brief and found for the petitioner in 59.6% (twenty-eight 
of forty-seven) of the cases with a petitioner amicus brief.  While these 
findings were statistically non-significant, they represent the opposite of 
what is to be expected.  As with the respondent briefs, a petitioner amicus 
brief did not affect sanctions liability,95 or how the Court treated the lower 
court’s  opinion.96 
 
4. Changes Over Time Concerning Amicus Briefs 
 
We then sought to explore whether the presence of amicus briefs has 
changed over time.  Again, our stratified sample included cases from 1971 
until 2010 to effectively gauge the effect of adding female Justices to the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  Throughout this period, the presence of amicus briefs 
increased in general.97  The likelihood that a case would have an amicus 
brief for the petitioner also significantly increased,98 however, there was 
only a marginally significant increase in the likelihood that the case would 
have an amicus brief for the respondent.99  This is especially interesting 
given the above finding that respondent amicus briefs had a significantly 
stronger effect on Court holdings than petitioner amicus briefs. 
We then examined if cases were more likely to have amicus curiae 
briefs, over time, before the appointment of the first female Justice.  Before 
the appointment of the first female Justice, cases were already receiving 
increasingly more amicus briefs filed for the petitioner,100 overall,101 but 
not for the respondent.102  This matches the trend that continued when 
female Justices were added to the Court.  Thus, it appears that it is the 
effect of time, and not the addition of female Justices, which led to the 
increase of amicus curiae briefs.  Additionally, the party for which the 
Court held did not significantly change over time.103 
 
 92 X 2 (4) = 7.00, p = .14. 
 93 X 2 (8) = 6.15, p = .63. 
 94 X 2 (1) = 0.35, p = .56. 
 95 X 2 (4) = 0.64, p = .96. 
 96 X 2 (8) = 4.86, p = .77. 
 97 F (35, 87) = 1.83, p < .05. 
 98 F (35, 87) = 1.76, p < .05. 
 99 F (35, 87) = 1.56, p = .07. 
 100 p < .05. 
 101 p < .05. 
 102 p = .08. 
 103 F (35, 84) = 1.04, p = .44. 
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B. The Role of Female Justices 
 
Our research sought to investigate whether the presence of one or more 
female Justices on the Court affected decisions in securities cases.  The 
results presented below will analyze the differences between the all-male 
Court and the Court after the addition of female Justices, as well as the 
differences among the various female compositions on the Court.  In 
addition, Appendix B presents regression analyses showing the predictive 
effect, if any, of the variables of interest coded in the database.  Overall, the 
regression results showed that there is no overall effect for gender across 
the entire case sample.  However, when evaluating the cases after the 
addition of female Justices, whether a female Justice authored the majority 
opinion significantly predicted what the Court held.104 
In the eighty-eight cases examined, twenty different Justices 
participated in the opinions and each was provided with his or her own 
code.  When examining the majority opinions, concurrences, and dissents, 
there were ninety-two different combinations of Justices, each provided 
with its own code.  We then split the variables into those including female 
Justices and those without female Justices.  Of the eighty-eight cases 
examined for this study, forty-nine of the opinions were issued by all male-
panels and thirty-nine of the opinions were issued by the Court when one or 
more female Justice was involved. 
 
1. The Panel Effect of Female Justices 
 
This initial set of analyses did not consider the role female Justices 
played (i.e., were they in the majority, concurrence, dissent, split amongst 
themselves) but, rather, looked to differences in the study variables 
between the all-male and female-included panels. 
Primary Finding: Female-Included Panels Do Not Differ Significantly 
from All-Male Panels in Types of Claims or Decision Outcomes 
First, we wanted to determine if the female-included panels faced 
different types of claims or different types of claimants than the exclusively 
male panels.  Neither the type of petitioners nor type of respondents 
differed between the panels.  For example, both panels had nineteen cases 
each with individual respondents and four cases each with institutional 
investors, while the male-only panels had eighteen corporations as 
respondents (female-included panels had twelve) and eight governmental 
respondents (female-included panels had four).105  The issues presented 
also did not significantly differ between the female-included and all-male 
 
 104 See infra Appendix B. 
 105 X2 (3) = 1.42, p =   .70.  Additionally,   the  parties  did  not  “switch  sides”   in  a  differential  manner  
between the two types of panels. When examining whether the petitioners or respondents were 
originally petitioners or respondents at the trial court level, there was no significant difference (p = .11). 
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panels.106  For both panels, the majority of cases involved the Exchange 
Act (51% of both the all-male and female-included panels), and a similar 
few involved the Securities Act (discussed in 20% of the all-male and 21% 
of the female-included  panels’  opinions).     Other   issues,   such  as the 1940 
Investment Company Act and state securities laws, were rare in the sample.  
Because eighty-six of the eighty-eight cases (98%) came from federal 
courts, we did not analyze any difference between cases which did or did 
not come from a federal court. 
Second, decision outcomes also did not differ between the all-male and 
female-included panels.  Panel composition did not meaningfully influence 
whether the Court found for the respondent (thirty (61%) for the all-male as 
compared to twenty-three (59%) of the female-included) or petitioner (in 
sixteen in each of the all-male and female-included panels, 33% and 41% 
respectively).107 
Secondary Trend: Female-Included Panels Less Likely than All-Male 
Panels to Show Pro-corporate Bias 
A simple analysis of whether the Court held for the petitioner or 
respondent does not consider the type of party potentially benefitting from 
the   Court’s   holding   or   that   party’s   likely   position   before   the   Court.      To  
explore these factors, we re-coded the type of petitioner and respondent so 
we could further examine when the Court held for a corporation or held 
against a corporation when only one party was a corporation.  We excluded 
cases where both parties were corporations or where neither was a 
corporation because each would require the Court to hold for or against a 
corporation, unless it found for neither or both.  The all-male panel found 
for a corporation in eighteen (69%) of these selected cases and against a 
corporation in eight (31%).  The female-included panel found for a 
corporation in fourteen (58%) of these selected cases and against a 
corporation in ten (42%).108  We  then  examined  whether  the  corporation’s  
original  status  as  plaintiff  or  defendant  affected  the  Court’s  decision. 
We first examined the all-male panels, looking only at the corporate 
parties.  When the Court found for the corporate petitioner, the corporation 
was the defendant in the lower court action in every case.  When the Court 
found for the corporate respondent, the corporation was the defendant in 
66% of the cases (and plaintiff in 33% of the cases).  This shows a strong 
trend of the Court finding for corporations when they are originally 
defendants, the party sued under the securities laws. 
In the female-included panels, when the Court found for the petitioner 
corporation, the corporation was originally the defendant in 77% of the 
 
 106 X2 (9) = 6.74, p = .67. For example, coders identified whether cases involved the 1933 Securities 
Act, the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, the 1940 Investment Company Act, or stated securities laws. 
 107 The remainder of the holdings either found for both parties or neither party. 
 108 There was not a significant difference in either this limited sample or the entire sample, with the 
other  cases  coded  “both  corporations”  or  “neither  corporation.” 
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cases, and the plaintiff in 23% of the cases.  When the Court found for the 
respondent corporation, the corporation was originally the defendant in 
57% of the cases and the plaintiff in 43% of the cases.  Although some 
studies suggest an increasing pro-business bias on the Court, our data 
suggest that this trend, at least measured by the identity of the party, is not 
as prominent in the securities context. 
Secondary Trend: Female-Included Panels Less Likely than All-Male 
Panels to Decline Imposition of Sanctions 
While the panels did not significantly differ in whether they imposed 
sanctions,109 the all-male panels were marginally more likely to decline to 
impose sanctions and the female-included panels were marginally more 
likely to leave open the possibility for sanctions.  Very few of the holdings 
in either panel imposed any type of monetary or nonmonetary sanctions.110 
Although related more to changes over time than gender composition, 
the female-included panels were significantly more likely to have cases 
with an amicus curiae brief for the petitioner (in 72% of cases, as compared 
to 59% for the all-male panels),111 and more likely to have cases with an 
amicus curiae brief for the respondent (in 74% of cases, as compared to 
49% for the all-male panels).112  The female-included panels were also 
significantly more likely to have amicus curiae briefs filed for both 
respondent and petitioner, as seen in Figure 1.113  Overall, 85% of opinions 
with a female in the majority included at least one amicus curiae brief, as 





 109 X2 (4) = 7.18, p = .13. Post-hoc analyses found that the all-male Court declined to impose 
sanctions in 53% of their cases, while the female-included Court declined to impose sanctions in 43% 
of their cases. Interestingly, the female-included Court left open the possibility of sanctions in 44% of 
their cases, while the all-male Court left open the possibility in 27%. 
 110 The all-male Court imposed monetary sanctions in one case and nonmonetary sanctions in three, 
while the female-included Court imposed monetary sanctions in three cases, but never nonmonetary 
sanctions. 
 111 X2 (1) = 8.41, p < .01. 
 112 X2 (1) = 4.99, p < .05. 
 113 X2 (2) = 9.04, p < .05. 
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Figure 1. Use of amicus curiae (AC) by all-male or female-included 
majority opinions. 
 
Thus, it does not appear that there were any significant differences 
in outcomes between the all-male and female-included panels as a whole, 
but there were differences in favoring corporations and the possibility of 
sanctions.  Additionally, as stated supra, the significant effects of amicus 
curiae briefs may not have any relationship to the gender composition of 
the Court but, rather, could be a result of the overall increase of such briefs 
over time. 
 
2. The Effect of Individual Justices 
 
But what about the voting patterns of the individual female Justices 
themselves?  Could there be significant differences in voting behavior 
based upon whether the female-included Court involved only Justice 
O’Connor,  both  Justices  O’Connor  and  Ginsburg,  solely  Justice  Ginsburg,  
or both Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor?  Table 1 displays the frequencies 
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Female Justices Frequency Percentage 
All male Court 49 55.7 
O’Connor   22 25.0 
O’Connor  and  Ginsburg 9 10.2 
Ginsburg 5 5.7 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor 3 3.4 
Total 88 100.0 
 
Table 1. Distribution of Female Justices Across Sample 
 
In the thirty-nine cases with females on the bench, at least one 
female Justice was in the majority opinion for thirty-five of the cases.  In 
the remaining four cases,  O’Connor  did  not  participate   in  one,  O’Connor  
concurred in part and dissented in part for one, Ginsburg dissented in one, 
and Ginsburg and Sotomayor dissented together in one.  Additionally, at 
least one female Justice was in the dissent for eight of the thirty-nine cases: 
O’Connor   was   in   the   dissent   in   three,   O’Connor   concurred   in   part   and  
dissented   in   part   for   one,   O’Connor   was   in   the   majority   and   Ginsburg  
dissented  in  one,  O’Connor  was  in  the  majority  and  Ginsburg  concurred  in  
part and dissented in part in one, Ginsburg dissented in one, and Ginsburg 
and Sotomayor dissented in one. 
Of the thirty-nine female-included panels, only twelve included 
more than one female Justice.  While Justice Sotomayor is still relatively 
new to the bench and there were only three cases in our sample with her on 
the panel, it is interesting to note that the rate of agreement between 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor is at 100.0%, whereas it was at 55.6% between 
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 Overall Agreement: 55.6% 






 Overall Agreement: 100% 
 
Table 2. Agreement Among Female Justices Across Sample 
 
We then explored potential case differences between the all-male, 
O’Connor-only,  O’Connor  and  Ginsburg,  Ginsburg-only, and Ginsburg and 
Sotomayor   panels   (referred   to   as   “Justice-specific   panels”).     The   Justice-
specific panels differed on type of petitioner,114 although this is likely 
because the government was a petitioner only in the all-male  and  O’Connor  
and Ginsburg panels.  The panels did not differ based upon type of 
respondent,115 but it is interesting to note that in all three of the cases with 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor, the petitioner was a corporation.  The respondent 
in these three cases was either an institutional investor or the U.S. 
government.  The Exchange Act was the most common legal issue 
presented for every Justice-specific panel, except for the panels with 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor.  The Exchange Act was considered in 71% of the 
cases overall, but in only one of the three Ginsburg-Sotomayor cases. 
The Justice-specific  panel’s  opinions  also  differed  based  upon  the  
presence of amicus curiae for the petitioner116 and respondent.117  As 
described supra in Part IV.C.4, cases brought to the all-male Court 
included amicus curiae for the petitioner 41% of the time, as compared to 
at least 68% of the time for the female-included panels, including in 100% 
(three for three) of the Ginsburg and Sotomayor cases.  Again, this is very 
likely due to changes over time rather than gender composition. 
Looking to the holdings of the securities cases, the Court was more 
likely to hold for the petitioner in every Justice-specific panel, except for 
the   O’Connor-only and the Ginsburg and Sotomayor panels.  The Court 
found for the petitioner 61% of the time for the all-male panel, 78% of the 
time   for   the  O’Connor   and  Ginsburg   panel,   and   80%  of   the   time for the 
 
 114 X2 (12) = 19.20, p = .08. Post-hoc analyses found significant differences based upon the number 
of government petitioners, as described in the text. 
 115 X2 (12) = 7.39, p = .83. 
 116 X2 (4) = 9.72, p < .05. 
 117 X2 (4) = 9.80, p < .05. 
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Ginsburg-only panel, but found for the petitioner 50% of the time for the 
O’Connor-only panel and 33% of the time (just one of three) in the 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor panel. 
Secondary Trend: Change in Pro-Corporate Bias Occurred upon 
Appointment of   Justice   O’Connor   and   Not   Gradually;;   Potential   for  
Influence of Confounding Factors 
When examining whether the Court found for or against a 
corporation, we again examined how many of the parties (both, one, or 
neither) were corporations.  Looking solely to when one of the parties was 
a corporation and the other was not, all of the Justice-specific panels were 
more likely to find in favor of the corporate party, except when Justice 
O’Connor  was  the  only  female.    See Table 3.  Combined, it appears that the 
Court  with  O’Connor  as  the  only  female  Justice  was  least  likely,  compared  
to the other Justice-specific panels, to hold in favor of either the corporate 
party, or the petitioner. 
As stated supra, the all-male panels had a stronger pro-corporate 
bias; every time the Court found for a petitioner corporation, the 
corporation was the defendant in the lower court action.  This additional 
analysis shows that the reduction in a potential pro-corporate bias started 
almost immediately after the addition of Justice O’Connor   to   the   Court,  
rather than gradually over time with the addition of female Justices.  We 
were not able to isolate gender as having a significant effect on any pro-
corporate bias in the Court.  As such, factors such as the ideology of the 
Justices, the economic and regulatory environment at the time of the 
decision, and similar factors may have influenced this trend.118  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the Court is showing increased interest in corporate 
and securities cases even as the Court has reduced the number of decisions 
it renders each term, and at least one study suggests that the Court is 







 118 For an acknowledgement of the potential role of ideology in securities cases, see infra note 145 
and accompanying text. 
 119 See, e.g., Shannon Green, Review of 2011 Securities Litigation Forecasts for 2012 and Beyond, 
LAW.COM (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202542022439 (noting 
that  “in 2010 and 2011 . . .   there’s  been  an  unusual   level  of  activity   from   the  U.S.  Supreme Court in 
securities cases”);;  Lee  Epstein et al., Is the Robert Court Pro-Business?, UNIV. OF S. CAL. (Dec. 17, 
2010), http://epstein.usc.edu/research/RobertsBusiness.pdf. 
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All male Court 18 8 
O’Connor   7 7 
O’Connor  and  Ginsburg 3 1 
Ginsburg 2 1 
Ginsburg and Sotomayor 2 1 
Total 32 18 
 
Table 3. Corporate Bias Across Justice-specific Panels 
 
Secondary Trend: Potential for Female-Included Panels to Decline 
Imposition of Sanctions Increased Over Time 
The Justice-specific panels did not significantly differ in their 
dispositions of cases (i.e., affirmed, reversed, remanded)120 or whether or 
not they imposed sanctions121, but an interesting trend emerged with 
refusals to impose sanctions.  While the all-male panels declined to impose 
sanctions in 53% of cases and left open the possibility of sanctions in 27% 
of  cases,  this  ratio  continued  to  erode  over  time.    Both  the  O’Connor,  and  
the  O’Connor  and  Ginsburg  panels  either  declined  to   impose  sanctions  or  
left open the possibility of sanctions in an equal number of cases (36% each 
for   the   O’Connor   cases   and   44%   each   for   the   O’Connor   and   Ginsburg  
cases).  Then, post-O’Connor,  the  cases  with  Ginsburg  as  the  only  female  
Justice left open the possibility of sanctions in 60% of cases and declined to 
impose sanctions in the remaining 40%, while the Ginsburg-Sotomayor-
included cases left open the possibility of sanctions in 66% of the cases and 
did not discuss sanctions in the third case.  See Figure 2.  It appears that 
Justices, over time, were less likely to decline to impose sanctions and 
more likely to leave open the possibility of sanctions. 
 
 120 X2 (32) = 42.32, p = .11. 
 121 X2 (16) = 14.12, p = .59. As noted earlier, however, female-included panels were marginally more 
likely to leave open the possibility of sanctions. 
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Figure 2. The rate of imposing sanctions by Justice-specific panels. 
 
a. Female-Included Majority Opinions 
 
While there were some interesting trends across the different 
Justice-specific panels, the gender composition of the Court panels was not 
the cause of such significant differences.  Of the thirty-nine female-
included panels, a female Justice was in the majority opinion for thirty-five 
of the cases.  This initially supposes that women are either prone to agree 
with the majority or work as unifiers, bringing the Justices together into a 
majority opinion. 
Because of the paucity of cases where women were on the Court 
but not in the majority opinion, statistical analyses were unlikely to define 
variability between cases with and without female-included majority 
opinions.  As expected, no significant differences emerged.  Still, we 
decided to examine both the thirty-five cases with female-included majority 
opinions and three female-included cases with women in the dissent and/or 
concurrence, but not in the majority.122  Future research might expand the 
 
 122 Note  that  this  excludes  the  one  case  where  Justice  O’Connor  did  not  take  part  in  the  judgment. 
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scope to include more cases and a greater variety of cases, in order to 
broaden the sample of cases where a female Justice is involved in the 
decision, but is not a member of the majority. 
Cases with a female joining the majority opinion and cases with an 
all-male panel were equally likely to find for the petitioner or 
respondent,123 with a slight bias toward the petitioner, and equally likely to 
hold for a corporation.124  The three groups (female in majority, all male, 
and female in concurrence or dissent) did not differ in the issues presented, 
as all three were significantly more likely to involve the Exchange Act.125 
These three groups significantly differed, however, in imposition 
of sanctions, as discussed above regarding all-male versus female-included 
panels.126  The all-male panels declined to impose sanctions in 53% of 
cases and left open the possibility of sanctions in 27% of cases, while the 
cases with a female in the majority declined to impose sanctions in 34% of 
cases and left open the possibility of sanctions in 49% of cases.  In the 
three cases where female Justices joined either the concurrence or dissent, 
one Court imposed monetary sanctions, one declined to impose, and 
sanctions were not discussed in the third.  None of the three left the 
sanction issue open. 
The split of the Court was significantly different among the three 
groups.127  All three groups significantly differed from each other at the p < 
.05 level.  Post-hoc analyses found that the Court split 5-4 in all three of the 
cases where a female Justice took part in the decision but did not join the 
majority.  There was a 5-4 split in only 11% of the cases with a female 
Justice in the majority and only 18% of the all-male cases.  Additionally, 
40% of the cases with at least one female Justice in the majority had a 
unanimous decision, compared to zero of the cases with a female taking 
part in the decision but not joining the majority and 16% of the all-male 
cases.128 
The findings that 5-4 decisions versus unanimous decisions were 
dependent on whether a female Justice voted with the majority are striking.  
They support an inference that female Justices bring a different approach 
 
 123 X2 (6) = 2.51, p = .87. 
 124 X2 (6) = 2.90, p = .82. 
 125 In 70% of the all-male cases, 71% of the female in majority cases, and 66% (two of three) of the 
female in concurrence or dissent cases. Resulting statistical analyses found these differences to not be 
statistically different. 
 126 X2 (8) = 15.65, p < .05. 
 127 F (2, 87) = 5.75, p < .01. 
 128 The significant percentage (40%) of cases with at least one female Justice in the majority that 
reached a unanimous verdict may suggest that a female presence and/or voice contributed to a greater 
collaborative effort. In contrast, there seems to have been more difficulty in reaching a consensus with 
an all-male bench, where only 16% of cases yielded a unanimous verdict. 
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both to the bench and deliberations concerning decisions.  This type of 
inference corresponds with gender studies that suggest that women are 
more collaborative in their negotiations and decision-making, and that they 
work to build consensus.129  We were not able, however, to isolate an effect 
so this inference, like many generalizations, should be noted with caution 
and explored more deeply. 
 
b. Female-Authored Majority Opinions 
 
Women were part of thirty-five of the thirty-nine majority 
opinions, but authored only five of those thirty-five opinions.  While a 
significant difference emerged for type of petitioner held for,130 this effect 
was solely due to the low number of female-authored opinions.  For 
instance, in the male-authored majority opinions, petitioners were split 
among seventeen (49%) individual petitioners, fifteen (43%) corporation 
petitioners, two (6%) institutional investors, and one (3%) government 
party.  For the female-authored majority opinions, two (40%) involved a 
government petitioner, while an individual, an institutional investor, and a 
corporation each comprised one petitioner (20% each). 
As with the female-included majority opinions, we also chose to 
determine if any differences existed between the five female-authored and 
thirty-five male-authored majority opinions.  Though not significant, it is 
interesting to note that four of the five female-authored opinions had 
individuals as respondents; four had amicus curiae for the petitioner and 
three had amicus curiae for the respondent. 
For female-authored majority opinions, the final court decision was 
about evenly split (the Court found for the petitioner in three (60%) and for 
the respondent in two (40%)).  Three of the decisions (60%) left open the 
possibility of sanctions, while one (20%) imposed monetary sanctions and 
one (60%) declined to impose sanctions.  The type of holding, however, did 
produce a significant effect, as four female-authored opinions (80%) 
reversed and remanded and one (20%) affirmed in part and remanded.131  
While only a small number of opinions were examined, it is intriguing that 
they clustered around a single holding, such as a reversal.  Additional 
research using a stratified sampling method to more equally compare 
female-authored and male-authored opinions is necessary to further explain 
this result. 
 
 129 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. 
 130 X2 (3) = 10.60, p < .05. 
 131 X2 (6) = 15.62, p < .05. 
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Nevertheless, we were intrigued by these trends and decided to 
examine these five female-authored majority opinions more closely to 
determine whether any qualitative associations existed.  All five cases 
involved at least one alleged violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act.132  As noted above, they all also remand at least one issue to the lower 
court.      Justice   O’Connor   authored   three   of   the   decisions   and   Justice  
Ginsburg authored two of the decisions.  Although each decision 
recognizes the importance of the anti-fraud objectives of the securities 
laws, two of the decisions, Tellabs (written by Ginsburg) and Shearson 
(written  by  O’Connor),  focused  on  the  provisions  of  other  applicable   laws 
to rule in favor of the original defendants on the particular issue in the 
securities cases.133  McMahon upholds the validity of an agreement to 
arbitrate a Rule 10b-5 claim, and, of course, once the claim is in arbitration, 
the claimant may prevail.134  Likewise, two of the decisions, O’Hagan  
(written by Ginsburg) and Edwards (written   by   O’Connor),   interpret  
federal securities laws in a way that broadens the behavior to which those 
laws extend.135  At least in these five decisions, the approaches of Ginsburg 
and  O’Connor  in  securities  cases  appear  similar.    Interestingly,  differences  
do  emerge  between  Ginsburg  and  O’Connor   in  other  securities  cases.     As  
discussed infra, these differences may relate more to ideology, however, 
than to a female perspective on business or securities cases.136 
 
c. Female-Included Concurrences 
 
Overall, forty-eight (43.2%) of the cases examined included a 
concurrence.  The number of Justices taking part in the concurrence 
included one (eighteen cases), two (five cases), three (ten cases), four 
(three cases), and five (two cases).  Of the forty-eight cases with a 
 
 132 See Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389 
(2004);;  United  States  v.  O’Hagan,  521  U.S.  642  (1997);;  Shearson/Am.  Express  v.  McMahon,  482  U.S.  
220 (1987); Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986). 
 133 See Tellabs,  551  U.S.  at  324  (interpreting  the  “strong  inference”  standard  under § 21D(b)(2) of 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)); see also Shearson, 482 U.S. at 225-26 (deferring to the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006), mandating enforcement of agreements to arbitrate 
statutory claims). 
 134 See McMahon, 482 U.S. 220. 
 135 See   O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653, 659 (applying the misappropriation theory to find that the 
defendant’s  trading  on  misappropriated  information  was a violation of § 10(b)); see also Edwards, 540 
U.S. at 396-97 (finding that an investment scheme promising a fixed rate of return is subject to federal 
securities laws because the scheme fell within the definition of an investment contract). 
 136 See infra Part IV.B.2(f). 
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concurrence, five included a female Justice.  Of those five cases, a female 
Justice was the sole author of none of the concurrences.137 
 
d. Female-Included Dissents 
 
Fifty one (58%) of the cases in which female Justices participated 
included a dissent.  The number of Justices included in the dissent were one 
(fifteen cases), two (five cases), three (sixteen cases), and four (fifteen 
cases).  Female Justices participated in eight dissents. 
We then attempted to identify any differences between all-male 
and female-included dissents.  Of the eighty-eight opinions, eight included 
dissents involving female Justices.  Again, the low number affects the 
ability to perform analyses.  However, significant differences still 
emerged.138  Female-included dissents were significantly more likely to 
include an amicus curiae brief for the petitioner (in 51% of the all-male 
dissents versus 88% of the female-included dissents),139 but not for the 
respondent.140  Interestingly, while male-only dissents were more evenly 
split among cases with no amicus curiae briefs (26%), one amicus curiae 
brief (38%), and both with amicus curiae briefs (36%), female-included 
dissents either did not include an amicus curiae brief (13%) or included an 
amicus curiae brief for both parties (88%).141  No other significant 
differences emerged. 
 
e. Female-Authored Dissents 
 
Female Justices co-authored three of the eight dissents, but were the 
sole author of no dissents in the sample.  There were no significant 
differences between the three female-authored dissents and the thirty-seven 
male-authored dissents.  Interestingly, but not significantly due to the low 
number of female-authored dissents, all three female-authored dissents 
included amicus curiae for both the respondent (73% for the male-authored 
dissents) and the petitioner (70% for the male-authored dissents), and all 
 
 137 See also Maule, supra note  83,  at  315  (“Concurrences  were  rarely  used  as  a  vehicle  by  the  female  
justices on the Minnesota State Supreme Court to express any voice, let alone a different voice. Female 
justices, on the whole, either agreed with both the outcome of and the legal reasoning behind a decision 
or  they  disagreed  with  the  decision  altogether.”). 
 138 A significant difference emerged regarding the type of petitioner (X2 (3) = 9.27, p < .05). 
However, this is likely due to the small number of dissents with female Justices. For example, while an 
institutional investor was the petitioner in two of the all-male and two of the female-included dissents, 
their percentage, as compared to the overall cases, is 2.5% and 25.0%. 
 139 X2 (1) = 3.86, p < .05. 
 140 X2 (1) = 2.54, p = .11. 
 141 X2 (2) = 8.22, p < .05. 
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three female-authored dissents found for the petitioner (54% for the male-
authored dissents). 
For the three female-authored dissents, two (67%) had a 
corporation as a petitioner and an individual respondent, and one (33%) 
had an individual petitioner and a corporation as the respondent.  Again, 
while this differs from the male-authored dissents where fourteen (38%) of 
cases had corporations as petitioners and seventeen (46%) had individual 
petitioners, eighteen (49%) of the cases had individual respondents and 
twelve (32%) had corporations as respondents. 
 
f. Justices  O’Connor  and  Ginsburg 
 
We then explored the five cases with  O’Connor   and  Ginsburg   in  
the  majority,  as  well  as  the  three  cases  with  O’Connor  in  the  majority  and  
Ginsburg in the dissent, in order to obtain a more descriptive understanding 
of these cases.  Interestingly, there were no cases with Ginsburg in the 
majority  and  O’Connor  in  the  dissent. 
For   the   five   cases   with   both   O’Connor   and   Ginsburg   in   the  
majority, the petitioner was either a corporation (two) or the government 
(three), and the respondent was an individual (four) or a corporation (one).  
The Court held for the petitioner corporation in two of the cases and, in 
both cases, the corporation was originally the defendant.  The Court held 
for the government as a petitioner in two cases.  The Court held for the 
individual respondent (who was originally the plaintiff) in one of the cases. 
The cases generally focused on the Exchange Act (three), with one 
involving both the Securities and Exchange Acts, and one involving the 
Exchange Act and a separate issue.  The majority opinions left open the 
possibility of sanctions in three of the cases, imposed monetary sanctions in 
one and declined to impose sanctions in one.  The court affirmed in one of 
the opinions, reversed in one of the opinions, and reversed and remanded in 
three of the opinions.  Surprisingly, all five of the opinions with both 
O’Connor  and  Ginsburg  in  the  majority  were  unanimous  opinions,  though  
one case also had a concur-in-part/dissent-in-part opinion in which three 
Justices joined. 
For  the  three  cases  with  O’Connor  in  the  majority  and  Ginsburg  in 
the dissent, the petitioner was either an individual (two) or institutional 
investor (one), and the respondent was either a corporation (two) or 
institutional investor/business entity (one).142  The Court found for the 
 
 142 Two of the cases involved the Exchange Act and one involved the Securities Act. The Court 
majority declined to impose sanctions in all three cases. The Court affirmed in one of the opinions, 
reversed in one of the opinions, and reversed and remanded in one of the opinions. One was a 7-2 
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petitioner in two of the opinions, but all three of the majority opinions 
limited the protections of the securities laws.  For example, in Gustafson v. 
Alloyd Co., the Court held that Section 12(2) of the Securities Act does not 
extend to private sale contracts;143 in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., the 
Court held Section 27(A)(b) of the Exchange Act, permitting reinstatement 
of certain actions previously dismissed as time barred, to be 
unconstitutional, preventing the original plaintiffs from pursuing their 
securities law claims against the original defendant;144 and in Central Bank 
of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, the Court held that a private 
party may not bring an aiding and abetting lawsuit under Section 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act.145  Moreover,   in   Justice   Ginsburg’s   dissent   in  
Gustafson—where ideologically liberal Justice Breyer and ideologically 
conservative Justices Thomas and Scalia also dissented—and in Justice 
Steven’s   dissent,   joined   by  Ginsburg,   in  Plaut, both Justices suggest that 
the   majority   decisions   ignored   “longstanding scholarly and judicial 
understanding”   of   the   respective   sections   of   the   securities   law   to   reach  
policy decisions.146 
As discussed supra, our data indicate that any pro-corporate bias in 
the   Court   weakened   upon   the   appointment   of   Justice   O’Connor   to   the  
bench.147  The data do not, however, show any significant gender impact 
on a pro-corporate bias.  Moreover, this anecdotal evidence suggests that 
when a pro-corporate bias was suggested by a decision easing regulations 
or making prosecution more difficult, Justices   O’Connor   and   Ginsburg  
were  more   likely   to  part  ways.     O’Connor  voted   to  foreclose   relief   in   the  
three cases, while Ginsburg voted to provide it.  At least in the context of 
securities cases, this observation may suggest that ideology, rather than 
gender, more often influences decisions.148  Although beyond the scope of 
 
majority opinion and two were 5-4   opinions.   One   had   a   concurrence,   which   neither   O’Connor   nor  
Ginsburg joined. 
 143 513 U.S. 561 (1995). 
 144 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
 145 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 146 Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 561; Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 193-94. 
 147 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 148 See Dixon, supra 43, at 313-14  (stating  Justice  O’Connor  and  Justice  Ginsburg’s  well-recognized 
political affiliation as a reputable conservative justice and equally renowned liberal justice, 
respectively). The then-President’s  political  affiliation  is  often  mirrored  through  his  appointed  Justice’s  
voting behaviors. Id. at 314. See also Matthew Sag et al., Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual 
Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CAL. L. REV. 801, 851 (2009) (noting that ideology influences judicial 
decision-making in corporate tax law and economic cases); Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Trumping 
the First Amendment?, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 81, 85—86 (2006) (discussing the impact ideology 
has on judicial decision-making); Lee Epstein, Barry Friedman & Nancy Staudt, On the Capacity of the 
Roberts Court to Generate Consequential Precedent, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1299, 1317 (2008) (finding that 
ideology  plays  a  significant  role  in  the  “production  of  noteworthy  decisions”). 
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this article, we believe that further research on this issue is warranted.  
Such research also may make a meaningful contribution to the current 
debate regarding the position of the Roberts Court in business cases. 
 
C. Gender in Securities Cases 
 
Our general finding that from 1971 through 2010, gender does not 
have an overall effect on the resolution of securities cases is a solid starting 
point for considering the future of those cases in the Supreme Court, 
particularly as an additional female Justice (Kagan) has taken the bench.  
Moreover, our discrete analyses suggesting meaningful trends in, and 
associations among, the data further inform this analysis.  The tendency of 
female-included panels to encourage unanimity while also being more 
likely to leave open the possibility of sanctions suggests some gender 
relevance.  Gender may not be outcome determinative in securities law 
cases, but it still may play a role in deliberations and the Court’s  decision-
making process.  We believe that further research should explore these 





Two developments underscore the importance of our findings: 
commentators suggest that the Court is more willing to grant certiorari to 
business law cases than in the past, and therefore, the Court will decide 
many of these cases with at least three female Justices on the bench.149  Our 
study demonstrates that, despite no discernible gender impact on the 
outcome of securities cases, several issues call for further study and 
ongoing observation in light of these two developments.  For example, our 
data suggest that the presence of one or two female Justices may influence 
the way in which the Court deliberates about securities cases, and may 
facilitate decisions built around consensus.  Perhaps a third Justice will 
amplify this effect.  This inference may be bolstered (or disproven) by 
future securities cases in which Justice Kagan participates, and may be 
applicable to other contexts as well.  Likewise, further analysis may 
uncover quantitative support for our anecdotal observation that ideology 
 
 149 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Business, the Environment, and the Roberts Court: A Preliminary 
Assessment, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 943, 946 (2009) (noting that the Roberts Court has had business 
cases account for one-third to one-half  of   the  Court’s  docket   in   recent  years,  giving   the  Court  a  pro-
business reputation); Matt Carter, Note & Comment, Punting on Logic: The Roberts Court to Sack 
Small Business Once Again in American Needle v. NFL, 30 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 477, 494 (2010) 
(noting that 40% of the Roberts Court cases granted certiorari involved business interests, which is an 
increase of 10% compared to the Rehnquist Court). 
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may   influence   the   Court’s   decisions   in   securities   cases.      In   addition,   the  
tempering effect that female Justices have on any pro-corporate bias, at 
least in the securities law context, warrants further study.  Our study 
provides an important baseline for further inquiry to enrich our 
understanding   of   the   Court’s   conduct   in,   and   the   influence of female 
Justices on, securities cases that are vital to our capital markets.
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APPENDIX A 
Final Coding Scheme Variables 
Variable No. Variable Description 
1a  Date 
1b Year 
2 Identity of Lead Petitioner/Code150 
3 Identity of Petitioner/Narrative 
4 Identity of Respondent/Code151 
5 Identity of Respondent/Narrative 
6 Identity of Plaintiff in Original Complaint 
7 Identity of Defendant in Original Complaint 
8a Whether Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner Involved 
8b Identity of any Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
8c Whether Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent Involved 
8d Identity of any Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent 
9 History of Case/Appeal from Federal or State Court? 
10 Securities Law Issue Before Supreme Court/Code 
11 Securities Law Issue Before Supreme Court/Narrative 
12 Holding of Court/Party 
13 Holding of Court/Impose Sanction or Liability 
14 Holding of Court/Narrative 
15 Holding  of  Court/Treatment  of  Lower  Court’s  Decision 
16a Number of Votes in Majority152 
16b Justices in Majority 
16c Author of Majority Opinion 
17a Number of Concurring Votes153 
17b Justices Concurring 
17c Author of Concurring Opinion 
18a Number of Votes in Dissent154 
18b Justices in Dissent 
18c Author of Dissenting Opinion 
19a Number of Justices Abstaining 
 
 150 Coders could choose from Individual, Institutional Investor (defined as any entity in its capacity 
as shareholder of issuer), Corporation, Government, Other. In identifying the petitioner and respondent, 
we  instructed  coders  to  focus  on  the  first  party  listed  or  the  “lead”  party.  Accordingly,  the  data  collected  
may not represent every type of party included as a petitioner or a respondent in any given case. We 
elected to focus on lead parties for consistency in the database. 
 151 See supra note 146. 
 152 We instructed coders to include all Justices joining the majority opinion, as well as any Justice 
concurring in judgment. 
 153 We instructed coders to include all Justices concurring in whole or in part. 
 154 We instructed coders to include all Justices dissenting in whole or in part. 
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19b Justices Abstaining 
20 Vote Count/Narrative 
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Appendix B 
Regression Results and Discussion 
 
Predicting Who the Court Held For 
 
 We performed a regression to determine which of our legal 
variables predicted whom the court finds for, both for the female-included 
and overall case samples.  This analysis sought to determine which 
variables led to a decision for the petitioner or respondent or for both or 
neither. 
 We performed a regression to determine the role of the major legal 
variables assessed in this study.  We first examined how the variables of 
interest affected whom the court voted for in the female-include only cases  
(N = 39). 
 As seen in Table 1, the overall model is significant.  Both the 
occurrence of an amicus curiae brief for the respondent and the holding 
(what the Court held) significantly predicted whom the Court held for.  
While the gender variables did not have an effect, whether the majority 
opinion was authored by a female did approach significance.155 
 
Outcome Model Summary Coefficient Summary 



























*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .06. 
 
Table 1. Regression with legal measures predicting holding. 
 
We then performed the regression analyses for the overall case 
sample (88 cases).  As shown in Table 2, the overall model is not 
significant.  Only respondent amicus curiae is a significant predictor of 
 
 155 A complete model with all of the variables was also tested. Females in dissent, female author of 
dissent, and the female concurrence variables did not have a significant effect in any of the regressions. 
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holding (who), with holding (what) marginally significant.  Female author 
no longer approaches significance in the overall sample.156 
 
Outcome Model Summary Coefficient Summary 



























*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .06. 
 
Table 2. Regression with legal measures predicting holding. 
 
 Additional regressions also determined that a female Justice on the 
bench did not significantly predict whom the Court held for, neither when 
the only gender-based variable in the regression equation nor when it was 
included along with whether a female authored the majority opinion. 
Overall, these regression analyses show that including a female Justice 
does not predict whether the Court finds for the respondent or petitioner. 
 
Predicting What the Court Held 
 
 We then performed the regression analyses to determine if the 
variables of interest predicted what the Court holds. 
 For the smaller sample of cases with female Justices on the bench, 
the overall model predicting what the Court held is significant.  Both who 
the Court held for and whether the majority opinion was written by a 
female predicted what the Court held.  Thus, we do have a gender effect 
here.  See Table 3. 
 
 
 156 The degrees of freedom differ from the overall number of cases because not every case had every 
variable coded. 
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Outcome Model Summary Coefficient Summary 































*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .06. 
 
Table 3. Regression with legal measures predicting holding. 
 
 In the overall sample, the overall model is significant, with whether 
there is a female-authored majority opinion as a significant predictor of 
what the Court holds.  However, it is not a strong model, with R2= .19. 
 
Outcome Model Summary Coefficient Summary 





























*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, ^ p < .06. 
 
Table 4. Regression with legal measures predicting holding. 
 
 Still, these regression analyses find that while the addition of 
female Justices did not significantly affect who the Court held for or what 
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the Court held, whether the majority opinion was authored by a female 
Justice was a significant predictor of what the Court found.  
